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Sexual Objectiﬁcation*
Timo Ju¨tten
According to Martha Nussbaum, objectiﬁcation is essentially a form of instru-
mentalization or use. I argue that this instrumentalization account fails to capture
the distinctive harms and wrongs of sexual objectiﬁcation, because it does not
explain the relationship between instrumentalization and the processes of social
stereotyping that make it possible. I develop an imposition account of sexual ob-
jectiﬁcation that provides such anexplanation and, therefore, should bepreferred
over the instrumentalization account. It draws on a contrast between imposition
and self-presentation and explains why sexual objectiﬁcation, understood as the
imposition of sex object status on women, is harmful and wrong.
The concept of sexual objectiﬁcation is central to feminist approaches to
social and political philosophy and to nonacademic feminist social crit-
icism. Academic discourse about sexual objectiﬁcation can be traced back
to Kant, though it has received most attention in the work of Catharine
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin and, more recently, Martha Nussbaum.
In nonacademic discourse, a range of writers and activists criticize as sex-
ual objectiﬁcation a wide variety of practices and institutions which par-
ticipate in the construction of women as sex objects.1 Given this range of
uses, it is perhaps not surprising that this concept does not seem to have
a settled meaning. Roughly speaking, one can distinguish two compet-
ing accounts of sexual objectiﬁcation. According to the instrumentalization
account, recently defended by Martha Nussbaum, objectiﬁcation is essen-
1. In this essay I am concerned speciﬁcally with the sexual objectiﬁcation of women in
the context of gender inequality. Some aspects of my analysis may be applicable to the
sexual objectiﬁcation of heterosexual men and of gays and lesbians, too, but other aspects
clearly are not, and therefore their sexual objectiﬁcation requires a different analysis.
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tially a form of instrumentalization or use.2 This is a nonmoralized ac-
count of objectiﬁcation. It is an open question whether a given case of
instrumentalization and, therefore, objectiﬁcation is morally wrong, and
the challenge for this account is to specify what exactly makes it wrong
when it is wrong. Nussbaum’s work on objectiﬁcation has been very
inﬂuential, and her article is the starting point for most discussions of
sexual objectiﬁcation inmoral and political philosophy today.3 According
to the imposition account, inspired by Catharine MacKinnon and to be
developed here, “to be sexually objectiﬁed means having a social mean-
ing imposed on your being that deﬁnes you as to be sexually used.”4 Here
the deﬁning feature of sexual objectiﬁcation is the imposition of a social
meaning on women, which marks them out as proper objects of instru-
mentalizing attitudes and treatment that undermine their autonomy and
equal social standing. This is a moralized account of objectiﬁcation; it is
always wrong. The challenge for this account is to specify what exactly the
imposition of a social meaning is, and why it is wrong.
It may be objected that my rough distinction between the instru-
mentalization and imposition accounts of sexual objectiﬁcation is over-
drawn. On the one hand, Nussbaum’s instrumentalization account of ob-
jectiﬁcation sometimes refers to instrumentalizing social meanings as well
as to instrumental use. Indeed, one of her examples of sexual objectiﬁ-
cation suggests an analysis in terms of the imposition of a social meaning
on women.5 However, Nussbaum’s discussion of objectiﬁcation mostly is
concerned with the actual treatment of a human being as a thing, that is,
with instrumental use, rather than with the social meanings that make
women vulnerable to such instrumental use, and her examples often con-
cern intimate interpersonal relationships, rather than the broader social
processes through which meanings are imposed on women as a class. On
the other hand, since the imposition account concerns the imposition
of a social meaning on women that deﬁnes them as “to be used,” instru-
3. For discussions of objectiﬁcation indebted to Nussbaum’s account, see, for exam-
ple, Rae Langton, “Autonomy-Denial in Objectiﬁcation,” in Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical
Essays on Pornography and Objectiﬁcation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Lina Pa-
padaki, “What Is Objectiﬁcation?” Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2010): 16–36.
4. CatharineMacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989), 140; see also MacKinnon’s Feminism Unmodiﬁed (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1987), 173.
5. The example concerns pictures in Playboy depicting the actress Nicollette Sheridan
(Nussbaum, “Objectiﬁcation,” 253).
2. See Martha Nussbaum, “Objectiﬁcation,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1995):
249–91, and “Feminism, Virtue, and Objectiﬁcation,” in Sex and Ethics: Essays on Sexuality,
Virtue, and the Good Life, ed. Raja Halwani (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2007). I say “essentially”
because I take it that this is the upshot of Nussbaum’s complex analysis. I will argue for this
view in Sec. I.
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mentalization clearly is central to this account as well. However, as we shall
see, the imposition of that social meaning on women is a harm and wrong
in itself, even if it does not lead to actual instrumentalization. Thus, my
rough distinction tracks a real difference in content and emphasis be-
tween two approaches to sexual objectiﬁcation. How should we choose
between these two approaches?
I believe that there are two closely related adequacy criteria that can
help us to choose between the instrumentalization and imposition ac-
counts. First, an adequate account of sexual objectiﬁcation will track the
meaning that feminist social critics typically attribute to it.6 Second, since
our aim is to capture the distinctive features of sexual objectiﬁcation, an
adequate account of it will pick out what is distinctive to the phenom-
enon and its harms and wrongs. My thesis in this essay is that the impo-
sition account meets these adequacy criteria better than the instrumen-
talization account. First, it seems to me that most activists who combat
sexual objectiﬁcation conceive of it as the imposition of sex object sta-
tus on women. For example, the activists of No More Page 3, a campaign
group dedicated to challenging the British tabloid newspaper tradition
of displaying a topless woman on page 3 of every edition, refer to it as the
“normalization of sexual objectiﬁcation.”7 Likewise, the activists of Ob-
ject, a London-based campaign group dedicated to challenging the “sex
object culture” oppose “the sexual objectiﬁcation of women through lads’
mags, lap dancing clubs or sexist advertising.”8 This suggests that these
groups are concernedprimarily with theways inwhichwomen aredeﬁned
in our culture as objects for male sexual pleasure, that is, as sex objects,
and they criticize the media which impose sex object status on women.
Second, this imposition of sex object status on women is a speciﬁc phe-
nomenon distinct from instrumentalization and harms women’s auton-
omy and equal social standing even in the absence of actual instrumen-
talization.Where women are instrumentalized in amorally impermissible
way as a result of their sex object status, they are subjected to an additional
harm and wrong, which is captured by the concept of mere instrumen-
talization, but which is not the distinct harm and wrong of sexual objecti-
ﬁcation. Thus, on the view defended here, imposition of the socialmeaning
“sex object” is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for sexual objectiﬁca-
tion. Morally impermissible instrumentalization is neither a necessary nor
6. This adequacy criterion does not prejudice the argument in favor of a moralized
account, because feminist social critics could use a nonmoralized account of sexual
objectiﬁcation but only criticize cases in which the phenomenon is morally wrong.
7. See https://nomorepage3.wordpress.com.
8. See the description of the group’s aims at https://www.youtube.com/channel
/UC92LM9vFOX1BsYWgYR1s6Sg/about.
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a sufﬁcient condition for it, but an additional harm and wrong that is
made possible by sexual objectiﬁcation.9
I will begin my argument with a brief discussion of Nussbaum’s
instrumentalization account of objectiﬁcation, elaborating further onmy
claim that it does not meet the second adequacy criterion outlined above
(Sec. I). Next, I will offer a normative analysis of the harms and wrongs of
sexual objectiﬁcation, drawing on the contrast between imposition and
self-presentation (Sec. II). This will put me into position to discuss what it
means to be a sex object and how sex object status is imposed on women
(Secs. III and IV). In closing, I will brieﬂy discuss a potential limitation of
my account of sexual objectiﬁcation: the fact that sexist meanings are not
always imposed on women but sometimes willingly embraced (Sec. V).
I
Nussbaum’s paper on objectiﬁcation pursues both phenomenological
and normative aims. On the phenomenological level she wants to explore
what it means to see and/or treat someone as an object.10 On the nor-
mative level she wants to argue that objectiﬁcation is a nonmoralized
concept: while some forms of objectiﬁcation are always wrong, other forms
of objectiﬁcation can be “necessary or even wonderful features of sexual
life.”11 Initially, she lists seven features that may be involved in treating-as-
an-object: instrumentality, denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility, vio-
lability, ownership, and denial of subjectivity.12 Treating-as-an-object and
therefore objectiﬁcation may involve one or more of these features, and
there is no precise rule that speciﬁes the necessary and sufﬁcient condi-
tions for a form of treatment to amount to objectiﬁcation.13 However, as
Nussbaum’s analysis progresses, she concludes that instrumentality, the
denial of autonomy, and, to a lesser degree, the denial of subjectivity are
particularly important on the normative level, and in a later paper she
10. Nussbaum, “Objectiﬁcation,” 251, 254. The fact that Nussbaum sometimes talks of
“seeing” or “regarding” rather than “treating” a human being as a thing suggests that she is
aware of the importance of the attitude that the objectiﬁer has toward the objectiﬁed.
However, her conceptual analysis of objectiﬁcation mostly occludes this dimension of it,
because of her focus on actual instrumentalization.
11. Ibid., 251.
12. Ibid., 256–57.
13. As Langton has pointed out, “when dealing with a cluster concept, something
counts as coming under the concept in case it satisﬁes a vague ‘sufﬁciently many’ of the
listed features” (“Autonomy-Denial in Objectiﬁcation,” 228).
9. However, as long as sexually objectifying meanings circulate in society, merely using
a woman for sexual purposes will impose sex object status on her, whether the user intends
so or not. Therefore, mere instrumentalization is sufﬁcient for sexual objectiﬁcation, given
our sexist social context. See my discussion in Sec. I.
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identiﬁes mere instrumentalization as the decisive wrong-making feature
of wrongful objectiﬁcation: “Objectiﬁcation is wrong, to the extent and in
the ways that it is, because it is always wrong to treat a human being as a
mere means to another’s ends.”14
The attraction of Nussbaum’s account clearly lies on the phenom-
enological level. She is able to show how the instrumental use that men
make of women often resembles the use they make of objects: in James
Hankinson’s pornographic novels, women’s autonomy and subjectivity
do not matter, and their inertness and violability are eroticized; in Play-
boy, their fungibility and commodiﬁcation are celebrated.15 In contrast,
Nussbaum thinks that permissible objectiﬁcation, such as that described
in D. H. Lawrence’s novels, does not involve instrumentalization at all.16
But this claim is implausible; surely we use and, therefore, instrumen-
talize our partners in all sexual acts; it is just that according to Nussbaum,
in Lawrence, instrumentalization is harmless and morally permissible.17
Thus when Nussbaum talks about the sort of instrumental use that ne-
gates autonomy, she must mean the sort of instrumental use that Kant
calls mere use: to treat someone as a mere means is to deny their auton-
omy.18 It is this conception of morally impermissible objectiﬁcation as
mere instrumentalization that enables Nussbaum to conceive of objec-
tiﬁcation as a nonmoralized concept, because she can conceive of per-
missible objectiﬁcation as permissible instrumentalization.
In my view, this characterization of objectiﬁcation puts the instru-
mentalization account on the wrong track, because once morally imper-
missible objectiﬁcation is conceived of as mere instrumentalization, the
whole analysis of objectiﬁcation becomes an analysis of the moral re-
quirements of permissible instrumentalization or use. To be sure, this
analysis is morally important and philosophically complex, because on
Nussbaum’s account, consent is not sufﬁcient for the permissible use of
another person; rather, a context of intimacy, symmetry, and mutuality
matters too.19 However, the analysis of instrumentalization in terms of
the quality of consent focuses too much on the narrow interpersonal con-
text that deﬁnes the relationship between sexual partners, and too little
14. Nussbaum, “Feminism, Virtue, and Objectiﬁcation,” 51.
15. Nussbaum, “Objectiﬁcation,” 280, 283.
16. Ibid., 273, 275.
17. On this point, see also Patricia Marino, “The Ethics of Sexual Objectiﬁcation:
Autonomy and Consent,” Inquiry 51 (2008): 345–64, at 352.
18. Nussbaum, “Objectiﬁcation,” 265. I take it that she is aware of it at all times, even
though sometimes she writes instrumentalization or use where mere instrumentalization or
mere use seems required.
19. For a discussion and critique of Nussbaum’s complex position, see Marino, “The
Ethics of Sexual Objectiﬁcation.”
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on the wider social context in which gender roles are formed that inform
male expectations about women and their sexuality.
To see this, consider Linda LeMoncheck’s example of the “unhappy
wife,” who submits to her husband’s drunk advances but feels that she is
nothing but a feelingless object for him on which he can call to satisfy his
desires. She feels used by her husband, because when it comes to sex he
doesn’t seem to care about her needs and desires but rather assumes
that, as his wife, she should oblige him regardless.20 What, if anything,
makes this a case of sexual objectiﬁcation? On the instrumentalization
account, it just is the fact that the husband uses his wife for his own
pleasure without regard to hers. Even though the wife consents to his
advances, her consent is insufﬁcient to absolve her husband from moral
blame, because it is clear that the context in which he uses her is not
characterized by intimacy, symmetry, and mutuality.21
On the imposition account, the husband’s behavior manifests the
existing sexual objectiﬁcation and reproduces it, because his behavior
occurs against the background of social meanings that portray women as
sex objects. This is clear in LeMoncheck’s description of the husband’s
attitude; he thinks that his wife ought to oblige because she is his wife,
and it is part of her role as his wife to satisfy his sexual desires. The social
meanings underpinning the husband’s attitude, for example the male
sex right, are not produced in private intimate relations, but they are
manifested in them and reproduced through their manifestation. In a
society in which these social meanings do not circulate, the husband’s
behavior would not manifest sexual objectiﬁcation but “merely mere
instrumentalization.”
Thus there are two distinct harms and wrongs here. The wife would
be right to blame her husband, saying, “you’re just using me,” because
he doesn’t care about her desires and feelings, and the context of his
behavior, their marriage, calls for such intimacy, symmetry, and mutu-
ality.22 But the wife also can blame her husband for his views of women as
the sexual servants of men, which are manifested in his behavior and
which harm and wrong her in a distinctive way, independently of the
harm and wrong of being merely used: they undermine her autonomy
20. See Linda LeMoncheck, Dehumanizing Women: Treating Persons as Sex Objects (To-
towa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), 8–14.
21. From a Kantian perspective, one may say that it is insufﬁcient not to treat a person
as a mere means; one also must treat her as an end in herself, and that may require sharing
her ends. See Onora O’Neill, “Between Consenting Adults,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14
(1985): 252–77.
22. This contextual characterization of the husband’s behavior leaves open the pos-
sibility that there may be other contexts in which sexual use does not require intimacy,
symmetry, or mutuality. For further discussion, see Marino, “Ethics of Sexual Objectiﬁca-
tion,” 358–361.
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and her equal social standing.23 And this would be true even if the hus-
band never did use her, perhaps because he always falls asleep after mak-
ing his drunk advances. In the remainder of this essay I will argue that the
concept of sexual objectiﬁcation captures this second harm and wrong,
and that it is brought about through the imposition of a social meaning,
sex object status. So understood, sexual objectiﬁcation captures some-
thing that eludes the instrumentalization account.
II
We can understand why the imposition of social meaning is harmful and
wrong if we recognize the importance of self-presentation to our agency.
In this section I will make the case for this claim and also explain why
sexual objectiﬁcation, understood as the imposition of a social meaning
on women, harms their autonomy and equal social standing. In the next
two sections I will discuss what exactly sex object status is and how it is
imposed on women.
In recent work on the topic, self-presentation has been discussed
primarily from the perspective of the individual agent in the context of
privacy and shame, where it can be understood in terms of concealment
and exposure. Thomas Nagel and David Velleman have shown how all
of us routinely create public images of ourselves by selecting which aspects
of ourselves we expose to others and which we conceal from them.24 This
selective self-presentation is not dishonest per se, because everyone knows
that our public images are carefully constructed in order to present our-
selves as targets for social interaction, which requires that others can rec-
ognize our public image as an intentional presentation of ourselves to
which they can respond. This may mean that we conceal beliefs and de-
sires that would make social interaction difﬁcult or impossible, or that we
foreground aspects of our person that help us to project our desired
image to others while backgrounding other aspects.25 It is an important
23. Note that such sexist views are compatible with respect for women’s achievements
in other spheres. Thus the husband may admire his wife’s skills as a lawyer (LeMoncheck,
Dehumanizing Women, 9). The point is that when her sexuality is salient she is objectiﬁed. And,
as I will argue in Sec. IV, men canmake any situation into one in which women’s sexuality is
salient.
24. See Thomas Nagel, “Concealment and Exposure,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 27
(1998): 3–30; J. David Velleman, “The Genesis of Shame,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 30
(2001): 27–52.
25. See Nagel’s example of the professor who is sexually attracted to a young col-
league: their professional relationship depends on his ability to conceal his attraction and
her ability to conceal her reaction to the obvious signs (“Concealment and Exposure,” 12–
13). See also Velleman’s example of his son’s embarrassment at being seen with his parents
because it brings home his continued dependence on them (“The Genesis of Shame,” 44–
45).
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result of this discussion that not being recognized as a self-presenter is an
existential threat to our agency:
Not being recognized as a self-presenter would entail not being
acknowledged as a potential partner in conversation, cooperation,
or even competition and conﬂict. You thus have a fundamental in-
terest in being recognized as a self-presenting creature, an interest
that is more fundamental, in fact, than your interest in presenting
any particular public image. Not to be seen as honest or intelligent
or attractive would be socially disadvantageous, but not to be seen as
a self-presenting creature would be socially disqualifying: it would
place you beyond the reach of social intercourse altogether.26
Velleman does not elaborate further on the nature of the threat at issue
here, but it seems to be a twofold threat. It is a threat to autonomy, be-
cause the inability to self-present threatens one’s ability to make claims
on one’s own behalf. Moreover, it is a threat to one’s equal social standing
in social interaction. I will say more about these threats below.
I think Nagel and Velleman are right to point to the role of self-
presentation in social interaction, but it is important to recognize that our
self-presentation does not take place in a vacuum.We present ourselves in
many different ways depending on context, and we do that by assuming
social roles that are available to us and intelligible to others in the relevant
context. Even where we are successful self-presenters, we don’t make up
social roles from scratch. Wemay combine a number of these roles in our
lives, mold them to the best of our abilities, and make them our own, but
we nevertheless rely on the intelligibility of these roles to others, because
a life course that does not make reference to any recognizable social role
is unrecognizable: it does not make sense to others, it cannot be recog-
nized as valuable by others, and therefore it cannot give us the recognition
of others that we need to form and present a coherent image of our-
selves.27 Thus, on the one hand, we have a natural interest in inﬂuencing
how others see us; on the other hand, how others see us inﬂuences how
we can see ourselves as being and, therefore, how we aim to present our-
selves to others.
If this is right, then opportunities for self-presentation depend on
at least two social conditions. First, they depend on our ability to be self-
26. Velleman, “The Genesis of Shame,” 37.
27. See Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth, “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition,
and Justice,” in Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, ed. John Christman and Joel
Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Anderson and Honneth argue
that it may be impossible or at least extremely costly to pursue a life that cannot be
recognized by others, because most of us depend on some form of afﬁrmative recognition
of the meaning and value of our chosen life and our ability to live it.
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presenters at all. Second, they depend on socially available meanings in
terms of which we can present ourselves. I want to argue that the sexual
objectiﬁcation of women limits their opportunities for self-presentation
and therefore their autonomous agency and equal social status, by un-
dermining both of these conditions. Where social meanings are imposed
on them, sexual objectiﬁcation directly undermines women’s ability to
be self-presenters. But even the everyday practices through which these
meanings are manifested and reproduced in public and in private indi-
rectly limit the ways in which women can present themselves, because the
prevalence of these meanings can marginalize nonsexist meanings. I will
focus on the imposition of meanings for now, but I shall return to the
consequences of limited socially available meanings toward the end of
the essay (Sec. V).
Velleman’s discussion of racist social stereotyping offers an example
of the imposition of a social meaning: “The target of racist remarks is
displayed not just as ‘the nigger’ or ‘the hymie,’ but as one who has thus
been captured in a socially deﬁned image that leaves no room for self-
presentation.”28 Velleman considers two defenses available to the victims of
such stereotyping. First, the victims may embrace the stereotype and make
it part of their deliberate self-presentation. However, this embrace of the
stereotype amounts to a compromise with racism insofar as the victims in-
corporate the stereotype into their public image in order to defend their
status as self-presenters. If this is the only defense available to them, they
may be deceived about their actual powers of self-presentation.29 In fact,
it seems to me that embracing a stereotype as part of one’s public image
may compromise one’s status as a self-presenter, even if it does genuinely
accord with one’s conception of oneself, because it is a stereotype that also
is imposed on people and, therefore, undermines one’s autonomy and
equal social standing by association.30 Second, victims of stereotyping may
try to escape the force of stereotyping by dismissing the perpetrators as
potential partners in social interaction. The perpetrators’ insults don’t
count, if they don’t count. However, Velleman suggests that stereotyping
remarks are often made in public, and the injury to autonomy and equal
social standing occurs when third parties witness the powerlessness of the
victim of stereotyping in the face of an assault on their agency and equality.31
28. Velleman, “The Genesis of Shame,” 45. Velleman suggests that the shame felt in
response to such remarks is properly understood as a response to the feeling of vulnera-
bility engendered by the loss of the ability to self-present.
29. Ibid., 46.
30. I brieﬂy discuss the question of whether women can embrace sex object status as
part of their public image in Sec. V.
31. Velleman, “The Genesis of Shame.” In Sec. IV, I suggest that the sexual objecti-
ﬁcation of women through sexual harassment leads to the same experience of power-
lessness.
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Perhaps Velleman’s characterization of the harm of stereotyping is
too strong. It is not clear why being captured in a socially deﬁned image
should leave no room, rather than less room, for self-presentation. In
that case a third defense is available to victims of social stereotyping. They
can try to construct a public image of themselves that negates the image
that others may have formed of them already on the basis of the stereo-
type. To be sure, on this account, victims of stereotyping still are harmed
and wronged because their opportunities for self-presentation are re-
stricted, even though they are not fully eradicated. They face additional
burdens in realizing their autonomy and equal social standing, because
they are singled out for social stereotyping. And this seems to be true
more generally in cases where a social meaning is imposed on someone.
The imposed meaning does not eradicate the person’s self-presentation
but rather becomes the most salient aspect of the person’s public image,
which licenses attitudes or behaviors toward the person that are associ-
ated with the imposed meaning.32 At the same time, the manifestation
of these attitudes and behaviors toward the person licenses others in
seeing her in the same way and therefore reproduces the imposition of
the social meaning. This also suggests that not all stereotypes are equally
disqualifying, because the severity of the threat that a stereotype poses to
its victims’ autonomy and equal social standing depends on the attitudes
and behaviors that are licensed by its content.33
The imposition of a social meaning on a person differs from our
ordinary practices of attributing social roles to people that we encounter.
For example, if I see someone as a teacher, I do not impose the social
meaning of “teacher” on her. Rather, I respond to an aspect of her public
image that is part of her deliberate self-presentation. Andwhilemy seeing
her as a teacher may license certain attitudes and behaviors toward her,
she has reason to expect these as part of her professional role and nor-
mally won’t experience them as an imposition.34 Of course, I may be
mistaken, and the person I see as a teacher in fact is not a teacher. Per-
haps some part of her self-presentation has reminded me of a teacher,
and I succumbed to a stereotype. In this case my misidentiﬁcation of her
32. This is very clear in Nussbaum’s discussion of Playboy’s “Women of the Ivy League”
issue (“Objectiﬁcation,” 283–86). While the students clearly are sexually objectiﬁed, it also
does matter that they are women of the Ivy League.
33. This explains why positive stereotypes may be less damaging than negative ones,
even though they also may undermine one’s self-presentation.
34. Note though that it is possible to be stereotyped as a teacher. In that case, cliche´s
and exaggerations about teachers may be imposed on a teacher in such a way as to
undermine her ability to self-present. As we have seen above, such stereotypingmay make it
more difﬁcult for the teacher to self-present as a teacher, because it makes it more difﬁcult
to appropriate the imposed social meaning as her own.
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may seem to license certain attitudes and behaviors toward the person
that are not in fact licensed. However, note that once the misidentiﬁca-
tion is cleared up, I no longer will see her as a teacher or display the
associated attitudes or behaviors.35
In contrast, imposed social meanings do not respond to the public
images that their victims present. Rather, they represent the attitudes
and desires of those who impose them. In Velleman’s example, the racists
make their victims’ race the most salient aspect of their public image
regardless of the role that it plays in their own self-presentation. Note that
the racists need not be conscious of the fact that it is their attitudes and
desires that lead them to direct the racist remarks at their victims, rather
than anything about the victims themselves. Nevertheless, this is what
makes them imposed socialmeanings. Similarly, menwho objectify women
make their sexuality the most salient feature of their public image re-
gardless of the role that it plays in their own self-presentation. In cases
such as sexual harassment, men need not be conscious of the fact that
it is their attitudes and desires that lead them to direct sexist remarks at
their victims. However, perhaps one difference between racist stereotyp-
ing and sexual objectiﬁcation is that sexual objectiﬁcation more often
works through media that consciously appeal to men’s attitudes and de-
sires, such as men’s magazines and pornography. In the remainder of the
essay I will discuss in more detail the social meanings that are imposed
on women and how they are imposed. Before Imove on to this task, I want
to explain in general terms how I understand the threat that sexual ob-
jectiﬁcation, considered as the imposition of a social meaning, poses to
people’s autonomy and equal social standing.
I agree with Nussbaum that sexual objectiﬁcation denies the auton-
omy of its victims.36 However, on the imposition account, this threat to
35. I think that this kind of stereotype may be similar to the one that MacKinnon
distinguishes from the imposition of a social meaning that constitutes sexual objectiﬁca-
tion. On this view, stereotyping “acts as though it’s all in the head” (Feminism Unmodiﬁed,
118). Consequently, all that is needed to overcome it is for stereotypers and stereotyped to
give up their mistaken views. In contrast, MacKinnon believes that sexual objectiﬁcation is
more like Velleman’s case of racist stereotyping: it enforces the unequal gender roles
constituted by male supremacy in the social world, so that signiﬁcant social change will be
necessary in order to overcome women’s subordination (ibid., 119).
36. Of course, on Nussbaum’s account, autonomy denial is only one of seven features
of treating-as-an-object, albeit an important one, especially when it comes to understanding
what makes objectiﬁcation wrong when it is wrong (“Objectiﬁcation,” 257, 265). Lina Pa-
padaki takes this argument further. On her account, objectiﬁcation is denial of humanity,
where humanity is deﬁned very similarly to autonomy as an individual’s rational nature and
capacity for choice (“What Is Objectiﬁcation?” 17–18, 32). The problem with this account is
that there are many different ways in which humanity can be denied, and it seems phe-
nomenologically implausible to me to characterize all of these ways as objectiﬁcation.
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autonomy takes a very speciﬁc form. To see this, it is worthwhile to return
brieﬂy to Velleman’s account of self-presentation. On this account, we
discover our autonomous will when we learn that we can resist our in-
stincts and determine for ourselves which of them to make part of our
public image and which to keep private.37 Over time, this public image
comes to deﬁne our behavior and makes it intelligible, both to ourselves
and to others, issuing in the fundamental interest in being recognized as a
self-presenting creature discussed above.38 Our ability to be recognized as
an autonomous agent depends on our ability to be recognized as a self-
presenting creature, because a deliberate public image demonstrates that
our will governs our actions and social interactions with others. Con-
versely, not being recognized as a self-presenter undermines our ability to
make claims on our own behalf, because only claims that are consistent
with our public image are recognizable as ours.39 Velleman’s discussion
mostly focuses onhow failures of privacy undermine self-presentation, but
his example of social stereotyping shows that the violation of our status as
self-presenters through the imposition of a social meaning also under-
mines our autonomy.40
So understood, sexual objectiﬁcation is a threat to women’s auton-
omy, because it invites men (and other women) to see them as sex objects
whose worth is deﬁned by men’s sexual interests, rather than as self-
presenting autonomous agents who make claims on their own behalf and
have the right to be recognized as such agents. This threat to autonomy
differs from more obvious threats to individual acts of self-determination,
but it is at least as serious as these threats, because it attacks women’s
social standing as autonomous agents that grants them the right to self-
determination in the ﬁrst place. Of course, once women’s social standing
as autonomous agents is undermined, they also become vulnerable to in-
terference with individual acts of self-determination, because it becomes
more difﬁcult to demand respect for their autonomy.41
37. See Velleman, “The Genesis of Shame,” 30–34.
38. Ibid., 37.
39. Of course, recognizing someone’s self-presented public image and their claims
does not imply that one has to agree with how they choose to present themselves or with
the claims they raise; both may be dishonest, for example. However, such disagreement
presupposes that one recognizes their deliberate character.
40. Velleman suggests that violations of privacy that undermine self-presentation (e.g.,
being the victim of a Peeping Tom) are marginal to the argument of his paper, because they
should not occasion shame, which is the proper response to one’s failure to manage one’s
privacy (“The Genesis of Shame,” 38). However, he suggests that the victim of racist social
stereotypingmay feel shame as a response to “the genuine vulnerability of being displayed as
less than the master of his self-deﬁnition and therefore less than a socially qualiﬁed agent”
(ibid., 45).
41. The important literature on silencing adds a further dimension to this threat to
autonomy which reinforces my argument here. Feminist philosophers such as Jennifer
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Sexual objectiﬁcation poses another, different threat to the equal
social standing of women. This standing is undermined when the impo-
sition of sex object status onwomen represents them as less than the social
equals ofmen. As JeremyWaldronhas pointed out, the assurance of equal
social standing to all citizens, which is the goal of any well-ordered society,
requires us to reﬂect on the visible appearance of our public spaces.42
He asks:
Can we characterize as well-ordered a society decorated—on ad-
vertising billboards, subway placards, and innumerable television
screens—in ways that demean one large class of its citizens, ways that
convey a degrading message about their sexuality, ways that high-
light a particular range of opportunities and activities presented as
appropriate for them to the exclusion of a large number of other
activities and opportunities, or ways that portray as normative a kind
of subordination in relationships that is at odds with the idea of
an autonomous person working out her own destiny under condi-
tions of justice and dignity?43
The answer, clearly, is that we cannot characterize such a sexist society as
well-ordered, and the reason for this is that its visual appearance ex-
presses disrespect for women and makes it extremely difﬁcult for them to
see themselves as men’s social equals. A similar question can be asked
about a society’s audible appearance when it insistently and repeatedly
42. See Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2012). In what follows, I draw on some aspects of Waldron’s discussion, but I
am aware that there are important differences as well as similarities between sexism and
racism, and I don’t want to suggest thatWaldron’s analysis of hate speech fully applies tomy
analysis of sexual objectiﬁcation. Waldron also refers to equal social standing as dignity
(5). Since dignity is a very complex concept, and it is difﬁcult to keep its many connota-
tions under control, I will refrain from using it here and refer to equal social standing
throughout.
43. Ibid., 89.
Hornsby and Rae Langton have argued along Austinian lines that free speech implies
freedom of illocutionary acts, that is, the ability to secure uptake for one’s communicative
speech acts (see Langton, “Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts,” Philosophy and Public Affairs
22 [1993]: 293–330; Hornsby and Langton, “Free Speech and Illocution,” Legal Theory 4
[1998]: 21–37). For a woman to have free speech in this sense, she must be recognized as a
self-presenting autonomous agent who can make claims on her own behalf. For example,
she must be able to be understood as refusing sex when she says no. In this context, the
feminist objection to pornography is that it can lead to illocutionary disablement, that is, a
situation in which a woman’s “no” is not understood as a refusal, perhaps because the
man’s exposure to pornography leads him to believe that when a woman says no to sex, she
really means yes (Langton discusses some disturbing evidence to this effect in “Speech Acts
and Unspeakable Acts,” 323–26).
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degrades a vulnerable group, such as through the street sexual harass-
ment recorded by the Everyday Sexism Project.44
Thus the imposition of sex object status on women represents them
as the sexual and social subordinates of men. Moreover, as we shall see
in Section IV, sexual objectiﬁcation has a “pedagogical function.”45 It
socializes men and women into gendered role expectations that teach
them to assume their sexual and social roles as superiors and subor-
dinates. The cumulative force of the practices and media of sexual objec-
tiﬁcation transforms representation into reality. The resulting subordi-
nate social status of women harms and wrongs them as a class. This is a
status harm additional to and independent of the harm to autonomy.
It means that women do not enjoy equal opportunities to men in many
areas of life and are vulnerable to gender-speciﬁc harms, including sexual
assault and rape.
III
So far I have suggested that sex object status is imposed on women based
on the attitudes and desires of men, and that it is a subordinate social
status. But what exactly does it mean to be a sex object, what conception
of sexuality does it entail, and how is it imposed on women?
To be a sex object is to be deﬁned by one’s sexual attributes, such as
one’s attractiveness and one’s availability for sex. Sex object status is
inherently “reductive” in the very speciﬁc sense that, as a sex object,
one’s sexual attributes are the most salient attributes of one’s person and
dominate one’s public image. Note that this is not the same thing as
being seen as sexually attractive or as being available for sex. Most of us
sometimes want to be seen as sexually attractive to others, and most of us
sometimes want to signal our availability for sex. But then we choose to
self-present accordingly; we present ourselves as attractively as possible
and signal our availability. In contrast, sex object status is an imposed
status because the attitudes and desires of others come to deﬁne one’s
public image. To be an object in this sense means that one’s meaning
and value in the eyes of others are determined by their interests and
44. Waldron initially limits his analysis to the visual appearance of society but later
acknowledges that its audible appearance also canmatter (ibid., 72). For more information
on the Everyday Sexism Project, see Laura Bates, Everyday Sexism (London: Simon &
Schuster, 2014). This book draws on the reports of thousands of women recorded on the
website http://www.everydaysexism.com.
45. Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, 91.
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values, just as the meaning and value of many ordinary objects are de-
termined by people’s interests and values.46
The view of women as sex objects is embedded in a particular
conception of human sexuality, and sexual objectiﬁcation reproduces
both. This conception of sexuality conceives of male and female sexual
desire as complementary and naturalizes both the sexual and social
subordination of women and the mechanisms through which it is en-
forced.47 If women, considered as sex objects, are the proper objects of
male sexual desire, then to be used in order to satisfy that desire must be
their proper purpose. At the more benign end of sexual objectiﬁcation,
women are shown as expressing their true nature through serving men’s
sexual interests. Their own sexual interests are constructed as mirror-
ing those of men. As MacKinnon puts it, commenting on the Playboy
“standard,” “to use a woman sexually does not violate her nature because
it expresses her nature; it is what she is for.”48 At the more pernicious
end, gender inequality itself is eroticized. Violent pornography “sexual-
izes rape, battery, sexual harassment, prostitution, and child sexual abuse;
it thereby celebrates, promotes, authorizes, and legitimizes them.”49 More
generally, MacKinnon suggests that pornography aimed at heterosexual
men in all its kinds, from Playboy to violent hardcore pornography, is one
of the main media through which sexual objectiﬁcation works, because
it constructs male and female gender roles on the basis of sexuality. One
does not need to agree with this strand of feminism on the whole in order
to appreciate this point. Whatever else is true of this pornography, it is
surely uncontested that it portrays women as sex objects (I will return to
this in Sec. IV).
To be sure, the social meanings that construct women as sex objects
compete with other available social meanings; they restrict rather than
eradicate women’s opportunities for self-presentation, because they can
46. An argument from recent Kant scholarship can illustrate this point: according to
Christine Korsgaard’s conferral account of value, nothing has unconditional value except
rational nature (i.e., humans). Everything else has its value conferred on it by rational
nature (i.e., humans). Thus, Kant’s argument that becoming the object of someone’s
sexual desire makes that person into a thing can be read as an argument about how sexual
desire changes our mode of valuation rather than about how sexual desire leads to a
morally problematic form of use.
47. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to discuss the concept of sexual comple-
mentarity in any detail here. Brieﬂy, the assumption of such complementarity may be based
on the complementarity of male and female reproductive functions. However, while sexual
desire has a natural basis, it also is socially shaped and therefore male and female sexual
desire cannot be assumed to be complementary, especially if both are shaped under
conditions of social inequality.
48. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodiﬁed, 138.
49. Ibid., 171.
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be used to make women’s sex object status salient and to dominate non-
sexist social meanings. Nevertheless, many women self-present success-
fully as men’s equals and autonomous agents on the basis of socially
recognizable statuses, roles, and achievements, despite the fact that some-
times they are reduced to sex objects. But these successful women should
not blind us to the harms and wrongs that many other women suffer
because of the burdens that sexual objectiﬁcation imposes on them.
These burdens do not fall on women accidentally but because men im-
pose them on women, and the fact that some women ﬂourish in spite of
them does not render them less unjust.50 The harm and wrong of sexual
objectiﬁcation resides in the fact that it makes women vulnerable; they
can be reduced to sex object status at any timewhen their sexual attributes
are made dominant in their public image. It may happen in the context
of sexual relations, like in the example of the unhappy wife, whose hus-
band manifests and thereby reproduces the view that women are sex
objects (see Sec. I), but it alsomayhappen inwork contexts, wherewomen
are diminished in their status as coworkers when male colleagues under-
mine their authority and conﬁdence through sexist jokes, sexually explicit
remarks, or leery stares.
This characterization of sex object status makes clear that it is a
subordinate social status. It is obvious that sexual objectiﬁcation serves
men’s sexual interests, both because practices of sexual objectiﬁcation
can be pleasurable in themselves and because, if pervasive, they are likely
to increase men’s sexual access to women. However, it is important to
note that sexual objectiﬁcation also serves men’s nonsexual interests in
maintaining power over women. The ability to cast women as sex objects
enables men to undermine women’s roles in many public and private
institutions, from workplaces to the political sphere, and to enforce their
compliance with their subordinate social roles.
It also makes clear that sexual objectiﬁcation imposes sex object
status on women qua women, and therefore concerns women as a class.
As a result, sexual objectiﬁcation is a threat to all women’s autonomy and
equal social standing. In particular, it is not limited to women who
conventionally are seen as “attractive” or “sexy.” Rather, sexual objecti-
ﬁcation threatens all women, because all women can be deﬁned by and
reduced to their sexual attractiveness and availability and be appraised
accordingly, positively or negatively, even though popular media such as
advertising or pornography perhaps are more likely to display conven-
tionally attractive and sexy women.51 To be sure, individual manifesta-
50. On this point, see also Anderson and Honneth, “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Rec-
ognition, and Justice,” 131, and my discussion in Sec. V.
51. In fact, pornography objectiﬁes all women, including disabled women, older
women, and pregnant women (see MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodiﬁed, 172).
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tions of sexual objectiﬁcation, such as the behavior of the chauvinist
husband in the example of the unhappy wife or Nussbaum’s example of
the Playboy feature on Nicollette Sheridan, usually single out individual
women. But the views about women and their sexuality that are mani-
fested are views about women as such.52
IV
While Nussbaum’s analysis of objectiﬁcation proceeds through a dis-
cussion of mostly literary examples, it is worth remembering that sex
object status is imposed on women throughmany different practices and
media. This includes the practices that construct and disseminate the
social meanings that characterize women as sex objects and practices that
help to reproduce and impose themonwomen: for example, the everyday
sexual harassment of women in public spaces and in the workplace.53
Media of sexual objectiﬁcation are all media which portray women as sex
objects, such as sexist advertising, music videos, men’s magazines, and
pornography.54 Of course, objectifying practices often use objectifying
media (e.g., when workers display pornographic materials in the work-
place). However, I think it is useful to discuss them separately, if only to
stress that sexual objectiﬁcation ismanifested and reproduced in everyday
actions as well as throughmedia representations of women as sex objects.
Let me begin with street sexual harassment as an example of an objecti-
fying practice, because of the parallels with the racist stereotyping dis-
cussed in Section II, and because it illustrates how the sexual objectiﬁ-
cation of women as a class is manifested and reproduced in individual
behavior and affects individual women.55
In recent years, feminists have drawn renewed attention to the per-
sistence of widespread sexism and sexual harassment in everyday life and
the attempts of women to ﬁght against it, ﬁrst and foremost through
various forms of consciousness-raising, including a Twitter hashtag re-
52. Thus I agree with Nussbaum that in the Playboy feature, the represented woman,
the actress representing her, and, ultimately, “real-life women, relevantly similar” are all
objectiﬁed (“Objectiﬁcation,” 284).
53. In what follows, “sexual harassment” always refers to the sexual harassment of
women by men.
54. In what follows, “pornography” always refers to pornography aimed at hetero-
sexual men rather than at women or gay men.
55. In this essay I use “sexual harassment” in the broad sense of the term to include
everyday forms of harassment that women face in public, rather than in the narrow sense in
which it is used in the legal context, where sexual harassment in the workplace is at issue.
For a brief discussion of paradigm cases of sexual harassment in these different senses, see
Jan Crosthwaite and Graham Priest, “The Deﬁnition of Sexual Harassment,” Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 66–82, at 68.
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cording incidences of “everyday sexism.”56 These everyday experiences
of women are very instructive for understanding how women are con-
structed as sex objects and why this is harmful and wrong. Consider, for
example, leering, wolf-whistling, sexual innuendo, and sexually explicit
remarks, taunts, offers, and threats randomly directed at women in public
spaces. All of these behaviors reduce women to sex objects in the eyes of
their harassers and invite others to see them in this way. More generally,
sexual harassment communicates to women that they lack control over
their self-presentation; there is nothing that they can do in order to avoid
being reduced to a sex object if the harassers enjoy reducing them to one
for their own titillation.
As Jan Crosthwaite and Graham Priest point out, the overarching
experience of sexually harassed women is a feeling of powerlessness. Sex-
ual harassment makes women aware of their less powerful status in society
and that this social subordination can be expressed through sexual be-
havior. Moreover, women feel powerless because they feel that they cannot
do anything against sexual harassment.57 Thus manifestations of sexual
harassment reproduce the powerlessness on which they depend. We can
see why sexual objectiﬁcation undermines women’s autonomy and equal
social standing. Sexual harassment oppresses women as women, through
the imposition of a social meaning that threatens their autonomy and
reproduces their social inequality. Their vulnerability to sexual violence
in particular is the result of their sex object status, but having that status is
the result of the continuous imposition of that status on women; sexual
harassment “make[s] the victim aware of the presence of the perpetrator
and her vulnerability to his sexual appraisal . . . forcing her to be aware of
her sexuality as perceived by (some) men and of herself as vulnerable to
the sexual predation of men.”58
The phenomenology of such everyday sexual harassment reveals
something about the way in which sexual objectiﬁcation produces and
reproduces women as sex objects. In particular, sexual harassment pre-
supposes some sense on the part of the harasser that his behavior is ap-
propriate. To be sure, this sense of appropriateness may be tacit, so
that the behavior will be accompanied by a faux thrill of transgression,
which adds to the titillating force of sexually explicit speech. Neverthe-
less, everyday sexual objectiﬁcation depends on socially available mean-
ings of women as sex objects that circulate already and are manifested
and reproduced whenever sexual objectiﬁcation occurs. Men who sex-
ually harass women act on the basis of beliefs about women and sex-
56. In the United Kingdom, many of these efforts are associated with the Everyday
Sexism Project (see n. 44).
57. Crosthwaite and Priest, “The Deﬁnition of Sexual Harassment,” 73–74.
58. Ibid., 68.
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uality, and at the same time they manifest and thereby reproduce these
beliefs through their behavior.
Women are portrayed as sex objects in many media, and while the
exact meaning they portray differs from medium to medium, what uniﬁes
them is the idea that the worth of women is properly determined by their
sexual attractiveness and availability to men. Thus sexist advertisements,
men’s magazines, music videos, and pornography all present women as
sex objects. What matters is not that a medium contains sexually explicit
material, but that it promotes the view that women are properly valued
and treated in terms of their sexual attractiveness and availability. More-
over, this is a sufﬁcient condition for being a medium of sexual objecti-
ﬁcation; it is not necessary that objectiﬁcation be intended.
Nevertheless, many feminists have argued that pornography aimed
at heterosexual men plays a particularly important role in reproducing
sexual objectiﬁcation.59 It serves at least two functions. First, if it is ha-
bitually used for sexual gratiﬁcation, it shapes sexual desire; the content
of sexual desire is inﬂuenced by the sexual roles and sexual relations
that are portrayed in pornography.60 Second, it communicates to its
consumers desires, behaviors, and expectations that are appropriate to
their sexual roles. These functions are complementary: the fact that
pornography is “masturbation material” does not mean that it does not
also communicate ideas about the respective roles of men and women.61
Rather, the fusion of the sexual arousal and satisfaction that it offers with
the portrayal of women as men’s sexual servants associates sexual ex-
perience with subordination. Moreover, pornography stakes a strong
claim to show “the truth about sex”62 in virtue of the very fact that it is
very pervasive and shows sexually explicit material. Pornographic images
and movies in particular possess a visceral immediacy that other dis-
courses about sexuality lack; its content is there for anyone to see, and
59. The philosophical literature on pornography is enormous. I do not attempt to do
it justice here or to adjudicate the many debates about its status as speech, its harm, or how
it should be regulated. All I want to do is gesture at how pornography plausibly can be seen
as a medium of sexual objectiﬁcation.
60. To mention one well-known example: the Minneapolis hearings heard evidence
that the phenomenon of “throat rapes” of women and gay men increased after the por-
nographic ﬁlm Deep Throat gained widespread notoriety (see Catharine MacKinnon and
Andrea Dworkin, eds., In Harm’s Way: The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings [Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1997], 68, 214).
61. This is what Waldron calls pornography’s “pedagogical function” (The Harm in
Hate Speech, 91; see also my discussion at the end of Sec. II). The term “masturbation
material” is from Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1993), 17.
62. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodiﬁed, 171. One does not need to agree with MacKinnon’s
view about male veriﬁcationist ideals in order to see the plausibility of this point.
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this makes it more compelling than anything one could be told about
it. This “truth” encompasses more than the mechanics of sexual acts,
though that may be what consumers of pornography look for; the “truth”
about sex also includes the stories that pornography tells, especially the
variety focusing on “real amateurs” and “castings” (where women who
want to be models or porn stars are made to have sex with “casting
agents”): that all women can be talked into sex, bought for sex, or pres-
sured into sex, regardless of what they initially say they want; that all
women like all kinds of sex or will agree to all kinds of sex, regardless of
what they initially say they like or will agree to; and so on. To be sure,
sometimes pornography depicts fantasy, rather than reality, ormen being
dominated by women, rather than vice versa, but even in these cases it
serves men’s sexual interests. It is produced for the purposes of male
sexual arousal and satisfaction, and the women depicted in it serve these
purposes, regardless of what they do. As a medium, pornography aimed
at heterosexual men presents a normative account of sexual relations
which constructs women as sexually subservient to men and therefore
entrenches their subordinate social status.
In conclusion, all practices and media that participate in the con-
struction of gender roles through sexual objectiﬁcation undermine wom-
en’s opportunities for self-presentation, because they construct what the
social status of women is on the basis of men’s interests. To object to these
media and practices, then, is to object to objectiﬁcation. As MacKinnon
puts it, in terms similar tomy own, “I want to increase women’s power over
sexuality, hence over our social deﬁnition and treatment. I think that means
decreasing the pornographers’ power over it.”63
V
As Natasha Walter has pointed out in a recent book on the return of
sexism, there is a trend in Western societies for women to embrace their
objectiﬁcation and to experience it as liberating and empowering.64 And
we should be concerned about this trend, if we believe that women should
not value themselves primarily in terms of their sexual attractiveness and
availability to men, because embracing these social meanings is detrimen-
tal to their autonomy and their equal social standing. This is particularly
true of young girls and women who are increasingly objectiﬁed and en-
couraged to adopt sexualized self-images early on in life. There can be little
doubt that this sexualization of women occurs in part through the same
media that directly impose social meanings on women, but it also is en-
63. Ibid., 140, emphasis added.
64. See Natasha Walter, Living Dolls: The Return of Sexism (London: Virago, 2010), 6.
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couraged by the circulation of sexist social meanings in general, in both
the public and private spheres. However, whereas the imposition of a
meaning is a process where views of women propagated in pornography
and other media are transferred onto women qua women, the phenome-
non under discussion here is more complex. It concerns the ways in which
the sexualized roles and identities of women considered as sex objects
become attractive to individual women.
Does this trend point to a limitation of the imposition account? If
the threat to women’s autonomy and equal social standing derives from
the imposition of sex object status on women as a class, then the em-
brace of sex object status may be thought to eliminate this threat. In fact,
one may wonder whether the concept of sexual objectiﬁcation adequately
describes this trend at all; wouldn’t it be more apt to conceptualize such
an embrace as subjectivization? Some of the phenomena that Walter dis-
cusses in her book, such as competitions for future topless models draw-
ing huge female crowds in nightclubs and women who see lap dancing or
prostitution as expressions of their sexual power over men, suggest such
an analysis.65 In particular, they suggest that there is a trend for women
to make their sexual attractiveness central to their self-worth. A full dis-
cussion of these phenomena is beyond the scope of this essay, but, in
closing, I want to offer some initial reasons for thinking that the impo-
sition account can, in fact, help us to understand the trend that Walter is
worried about, even though a different analysis may be required to un-
derstand these phenomena fully.
As we have seen in Section II, we self-present by assuming social
roles that are available to us and intelligible to others in the relevant
context. If practices and media of sexual objectiﬁcation limit the so-
cially available meanings in terms of which women can present them-
selves, then they may have little choice but to construct public images
that draw on sexist social meanings. This is true especially if many men
(and women) will respond positively to these public images in some
contexts, and therefore women may experience them as liberating and
empowering in these contexts. Nevertheless, the voluntariness of peo-
ple’s choices depends on the quality of available choices, and in a sexist
society the prevalence of sexist social meanings may compromise the
voluntariness of choice. Therefore, it may be appropriate to think of the
phenomena that Walter describes as the result of an indirect imposi-
tion of sex object status on women.
Moreover, given my analysis in Section III, it is unsurprising that sex
object status licenses the same attitudes and behaviors whether it is im-
posed or embraced. As a subordinate social status, it threatens women’s
65. Ibid., chaps. 1 and 2, respectively.
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autonomy and equal social standing in both cases. This is clear in Wal-
ter’s interviews with several women who work in the sex industry, as lap
dancers or prostitutes, and who talk about the power and freedom they
experience through the admiration of their clients. The women also
note that this power is momentary and superﬁcial, because they are very
aware of the fact that on a deeper level a lot of their clients despise them.
They admire lap dancers’ bodies and sexiness, but they don’t admire lap
dancers. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that some of the media that
encourage women to be topless models or lap dancers speciﬁcally appeal
to women from challenging socioeconomic backgrounds who they see
as having few meaningful opportunities for social mobility. Thus, as a
matter of fact, women’s choices often may be “fueled more by desper-
ation than liberation.”66 But if women embrace sexualized self-images,
because they are encouraged to do so by a socioeconomic structure in
which a particular image of “sexy” femininity is a condition of material
security, then the conceptual distinction between imposition and em-
brace of sex object status looks a lot less clear-cut.67
Of course, not all women who embrace sexualized self-images do so
out of desperation or lack of choice, and some women even may proﬁt
from their sex object status and consciously choose to make sexist social
meanings a part of their public image. One may think that this is the
case with many successful actresses and pop stars who seem to be able
to combine a sexualized self-image with high social status. However, as
Nussbaum’s example of Nicollette Sheridan’s Playboy photos shows,68
these celebrities remain vulnerable to attacks that reduce them to their
sex object status. Presumably, actresses, pop stars, and other celebrities
learn to live with these attacks or to ignore them, but their persistence
shows that it remains difﬁcult for women to defend their equal social
standing when they adopt sexualized self-images. At the same time, suc-
cessful women who incorporate sexist social meanings into their public
images may help to reproduce these meanings and become complicit
in the reproduction of the social context in which sexual objectiﬁcation
occurs.
Finally, isn’t it self-defeating for women to seek empowerment and
liberation through the adoption of a self-image that makes their self-
worth dependent uponmen’s appraisal of their sexual attractiveness and
availability for sex? Self-worth requires the recognition of one’s achieve-
ments in pursuing an autonomously chosen conception of the good and
66. Ibid., 35.
67. I am not suggesting that women necessarily make these decisions consciously.
Decisions about dress, makeup, mannerisms, and speech are made on the basis of con-
ventions that are deeply embedded in class-speciﬁc socialization processes.
68. See Nussbaum, “Objectiﬁcation,” 253.
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of one’s equal social standing, and both are eroded if the sexist social
meanings that are prevalent in Western societies limit women’s oppor-
tunities for self-presentation and encourage them to embrace a sexual-
ized public image. Just as Velleman’s victim of social stereotyping cannot
embrace the stereotype without making a compromise with racism (see
Sec. II), women should be weary of embracing the sexualized self-images
that they are encouraged to embrace. The association with imposed so-
cial meanings may undermine their status as autonomous self-presenters
who have equal social standing to men, regardless of the voluntariness of
their own choices.
VI
In this essay I have argued that we should prefer the imposition account
of sexual objectiﬁcation over Nussbaum’s instrumentalization account,
which has received much attention in recent years. I began with an ar-
gument against Nussbaum’s instrumentalization account, showing that
it does not explain the relationship between instrumentalization and the
processes of social stereotyping of women that make this instrumentaliza-
tion possible (Sec. I). Next, I developed an imposition account through a
contrast between imposition and self-presentation and discussions of the
content and media of sexual objectiﬁcation (Secs. II–IV). Finally, I of-
fered some tentative thoughts about a possible limitation of this account
(Sec. V). I have argued that the imposition account identiﬁes a dis-
tinctive harm andwrong to women that undermines their autonomy and
equal social standing even in the absence of actual instrumentalization,
which is the focus of the instrumentalization account, and that prac-
tices and media of sexual objectiﬁcation should be morally criticized on
that basis. Unfortunately, I do not have space to discuss the question of
whether the harms and wrongs of sexual objectiﬁcation identiﬁed here
justify the legal regulation or prohibition of media of sexual objectiﬁ-
cation, such as pornography, but it is worth noting that the imposition
account could justify such regulation or prohibition independently of
empirical arguments about whether women are, as a matter of fact, in-
strumentalized subsequent to their objectiﬁcation, because it criticizes
sexual objectiﬁcation for undermining women’s equal opportunity to
exercise their autonomy and their equal social standing, which is a sta-
tus harm.69
69. Here I agree with Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech.
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